There are logics where necessity is defined by means of a given identity connective: ϕ := ϕ ≡ ⊤ (⊤ is a tautology). On the other hand, in many standard modal logics the concept of propositional identity (PI) ϕ ≡ ψ can be defined by strict equivalence (SE) (ϕ ↔ ψ). All these approaches to modality involve a principle that we call the Collapse Axiom (CA): "There is only one necessary proposition." In this paper, we consider a notion of PI which relies on the identity axioms of Suszko's non-Fregean logic SCI . Then S3 proves to be the smallest Lewis modal system where PI can be defined as SE. We extend S3 to a non-Fregean logic with propositional quantifiers such that necessity and PI are integrated as non-interdefinable concepts. CA is not valid and PI refines SE. Models are expansions of SCI -models. We show that SCI -models are Boolean prealgebras, and vice-versa. This associates Non-Fregean Logic with research on Hyperintensional Semantics. PI equals SE iff models are Boolean algebras and CA holds. A representation result establishes a connection to Fine's approach to propositional quantifiers and shows that our theories are conservative extensions of S3-S5, respectively. If we exclude the Barcan formula and a related axiom, then the resulting systems are still complete w.r.t. a simpler denotational semantics.
Introduction
The semantical approach to some Lewis-style modal logics studied in this paper relies on the principles of R. Suszko's non-Fregean logic (see, e.g., [3, 4, 21, 22] ). The essential feature of a non-Fregean logic is an identity connective ≡ such that (ϕ ≡ ψ) → (ϕ ↔ ψ) is a theorem but the so-called Fregean Axiom (ϕ ↔ ψ) → (ϕ ≡ ψ) is not valid. A formula ϕ ≡ ψ can be read as "ϕ and ψ have the same denotation." The basic non-Fregean logic is the Sentential Calculus with Identity SCI [3, 4] . SCI extends classical propositional logic by an identity connective and identity axioms which constraints are (at least in case of Lewis systems S3 -S5 ) unnecessarily strong and restrict the potential of intensional modeling in non-Fregean logic. For instance, in [15] it is shown that if a non-Fregean model has many necessary (=known) propositions, then common knowledge in a group can be modeled in a natural way. The approaches mentioned above adopt the limitations which are already inherent in possible worlds semantics. In fact, if at a given normal world w (in some Kripke frame), the proposition denoted by formula ϕ is defined as the set of those worlds which are accessible from w and where ϕ is true, then ϕ and ψ denote the same proposition iff (ϕ ↔ ψ) is true at w. Hence, propositional identity ϕ ≡ ψ is given by strict equivalence. Suppose now ϕ and ψ are true at w. Since ϕ → (ψ → ϕ) is a theorem, Necessitation yields (ϕ → (ψ → ϕ)). Applying the K-axiom and Modus Ponens, we derive (ψ → ϕ). Similarly, we obtain (ϕ → ψ). Thus, ϕ and ψ are strictly equivalent and denote the same proposition. Thus, the Collapse Axiom ( ϕ ∧ ψ) → (ϕ ≡ ψ) is valid. One goal of this paper is to capture some Lewis modal systems by a nonFregean semantics without the above described limitations. In particular, the Collapse Axiom should be invalid. Consequently, necessity and propositional identity must be axiomatized independently from each other. A further goal of this paper is to find an appropriate axiomatization of propositional quantifiers (i.e., quantifiers that range over the model-theoretic universe of a model) which is independent from specific properties of the possible worlds framework. In a first approach, we give an axiomatization which essentially corresponds to that presented by K. Fine [8] and which is sound and complete w.r.t. our first kind of denotational semantics. That axiomatization contains the Barcan formula, valid in the possible worlds semantics considered in [8, 5] , as well as a related extensional principle. Both principles can be excluded from the original axiomatization if we work with a weaker, simpler and in some sense "more intensional" denotational semantics which we consider in the last section of the paper.
The deductive system
The set F m(C) of formulas is inductively defined over a set V = {x 0 , x 1 , x 2 , ...} of propositional variables, a set C of propositional constants such that ⊤, ⊥ ∈ C, logical connectives ¬, →, ∨, ∧, ⊥, ⊤, the identity connective ≡, the modal operator for necessity and a universal propositional quantifier ∀. ϕ ↔ ψ is an abbreviation for (ϕ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ). By var(ϕ), f var(ϕ), con(ϕ) we denote the set of variables, free variables, constants occurring in formula ϕ, respectively. These notations also apply (in the obvious way) to sets of formulas Φ, e.g., f var(Φ) etc. A substitution is a function σ : V ∪ C → F m(C). If u 1 , ..., u n ∈ V ∪ C, ψ 1 , ..., ψ n ∈ F m(C) and σ is a substitution, then σ[u 1 := ψ 1 , ..., u n := ψ n ] is the substitution which maps u i to ψ i (i = 1, ..., n) and coincides with σ on (V ∪ C) {u 1 , ..., u n }. The identity substitution u → u is denoted by ε. Instead of ε[u 1 := ψ 1 , ..., u n := ψ n ] we also write [u 1 := ψ 1 , ..., u n := ψ n ]. If we write σ : V → F m(C), then we tacitly assume that σ is a substitution satisfying σ(c) = c for all c ∈ C. A substitution σ extends to a function from F m(C) to F m(C) which we denote again by σ. We apply postfix notation: ϕ[σ]. The extension is defined canonically in most of the cases: (ϕ ∨ ψ) [ where y is the least variable of V greater than all elements of {f var(σ(u)) | u ∈ f var(∀xϕ) ∪ con(∀xϕ)}. We say that the variable y is forced by the substitution σ w.r.t. ∀xϕ.
In analogy to the Lambda Calculus, two formulas ϕ, ψ are said to be alpha-congruent, notation: ϕ = α ψ, if ϕ and ψ differ at most on their bound variables. For instance, ∀x((x ≡ ⊥) ∨ (x ≡ ⊤)) = α ∀y((y ≡ ⊥) ∨ (y ≡ ⊤)). Alpha-congruent formulas express the same intension and should denote the same proposition in every model. This is ensured by the model-theoretic semantics.
We assume that ∀xϕ ∈ F m(C) implies x ∈ f var(ϕ). Strings such as ∀xc or ∀y(x ≡ x) are not formulas. This can be guaranteed by a suitable definition of F m(C), see [16] . Also for a proof of the following fact we refer the reader to [16] . Recall that ε is the identity substitution. ε applied to a formula may result in a renaming of bound variables.
Lemma 2.1 ([16]) Let ϕ, ψ ∈ F m(C). Then ϕ[ε]
The quantifier rank qr(ϕ) of a formula ϕ is recursively defined in the following way: qr(u) = 0 for u ∈ V ∪ C, qr(¬ψ) = qr( ψ) = qr(ψ), qr(ψ@χ) = max{qr(ψ), qr(χ)}, where @ ∈ {∨, ∧, →, ≡}, qr(∀xψ) = 1 + qr(ψ).
A sentence is a formula with no free variables. F m m ⊆ F m(C) is the set of formulas of basic modal logic, i.e., the set of those formulas which are quantifier-free, do not contain the identity connective and do not contain constants distinct from ⊥, ⊤. F m p is the set of those formulas of F m m which do not contain the modal operator , i.e., F m p is the set of formulas of basic propositional logic. By a substitution-instance of ϕ ∈ F m p we mean a formula which results from uniformly replacing some variables in ϕ by formulas of F m(C).
All formulas of the following form are axioms:
(i) propositional tautologies and their substitution-instances
The set AX of all axioms is the smallest set that contains all formulas (i)-(xiii) above and is closed under the following condition (*): If ϕ is an axiom and x ∈ f var(ϕ), then ∀xϕ is an axiom.
The rules of inference are:
• Modus Ponens MP: "From ϕ and ϕ → ψ infer ψ."
• Axiom Necessitation AN: "If ϕ is an axiom, then infer ϕ."
The resulting deductive system is an amalgam of basic non-Fregean logic SCI (propositional logic + the axioms of propositional identity (v)-(vii)) and Lewis modal logic S3 (propositional logic + axioms (ii)-(iv) + rule AN) together with axioms for propositional quantification (axioms (ix)-(xiii)) and bridge axiom (viii). 3 We refer to that system as S3 ∀ ≡ . S4 ∀ ≡ is the system that results from adding the axiom scheme ϕ → ϕ. S5 ∀ ≡ is obtained by adding the scheme ¬ ϕ → ¬ ϕ to S4 ∀ ≡ . Since the Necessitation Rule is not part of the deductive system, we are able to define the notion of derivation in the same natural way as in (non-modal) propositional logic: a derivation of ϕ ∈ F m(C) from Φ ⊆ F m(C) is a finite sequence of formulas ϕ 1 , ..., ϕ n = ϕ such that for each i = 1, ..., n: ϕ i ∈ Φ or ϕ i is an axiom or ϕ i is obtained by rule AN or ϕ i is obtained by rule MP applied to formulas ϕ j , ϕ k = ϕ j → ϕ i , where j, k < i.
Usually, the Barcan formula (axiom (xiii)) refers to a certain semantic property of first-order modal logics and in that context it has been the object of some philosophical debates. The Barcan formula is also considered as an axiom in the approaches to propositional quantifiers presented by Fine [8] and Bull [5] . In fact, the Barcan formula as well as its converse (axiom (xii)) are valid in the possible worlds semantics. In our approach, the Barcan formula corresponds to a semantic property which is used to establish soundness of Axiom Necessitation (see the first equivalence of (3.1) after Definition 3.4 below). The converse of the Barcan formula ensures that a weak Generalization Rule holds, see Lemma 2.4 below. 4 Note that if propositional identity ϕ ≡ ψ is given by strict equivalence (ϕ ↔ ψ), then the bridge axiom (viii) is derivable from the Barcan formula. In the proof of the Completeness Theorem, axiom (viii) ensures that a certain higher-order function on the universe of the constructed model is welldefined. In the simpler and weaker semantics defined in the last section, models do not contain that higher-order function and the Barcan formula as well as axiom (viii) can be avoided. Proof. It is enough to consider m = 3. The assertion can be shown by induction on the length n of a derivation of ψ from Φ ∪ {ϕ}. If n = 1, then ψ is an axiom or ψ ∈ Φ ∪ {ϕ} or ψ is obtained by the rule of Axiom Necessitation AN. In the first two cases, the assertion follows from standard arguments using classical propositional logic. Suppose ψ = ψ ′ for some axiom ψ
is an axiom (a substitution-instance of a propositional tautology), MP yields the assertion. Now suppose n > 1 and the claim is true for all derivations of length ≤ n − 1. We may assume that the last step in the derivation is MP (all other cases follow in the same way as before). The assertion then follows from axioms of propositional logic. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2.4 (Generalization)
Proof. As before, we consider m = 3 and show the assertion by induction on the length n of a derivation. If n = 1 and the conditions of the Lemma hold, then ϕ is an axiom or it is obtained by AN (note that ϕ ∈ Φ is impossible). In the first case, ∀xϕ is an axiom and therefore Φ ⊢ 3 ∀xϕ. In the second case, ϕ = ϕ ′ for some axiom ϕ ′ . Then ∀xϕ ′ is an axiom, and by AN we obtain Φ ⊢ 3 ∀xϕ ′ . Axiom (xii) and MP yield the assertion. Now we suppose n > 1 and the assertion holds for all derivations of length ≤ n − 1. We may assume that the last step of the derivation is MP. There are formulas ψ and ψ → ϕ derived in less steps. If x ∈ f var(ψ), then by induction hypothesis: Φ ⊢ 3 ∀xψ and Φ ⊢ 3 ∀x(ψ → ϕ). The assertion then follows from axiom (x) and MP. Now suppose x / ∈ f var(ψ). Since x ∈ f var(ϕ), the induction hypothesis yields Φ ⊢ 3 ∀x(ψ → ϕ). By axiom (xi) and MP, Φ ⊢ 3 ψ → ∀xϕ. MP yields the assertion. Q.E.D. Proof. We fix m = 4 and show the assertion by induction on the length n of a derivation of ϕ from the empty set. If n = 1, then ϕ is an axiom or ϕ is derived by the rule AN. In the former case, AN yields ⊢ 4 ϕ. In the latter case, there is an axiom ψ such that ϕ = ψ. Then the axiom ψ → ψ and the rule of MP yield ⊢ 4 ϕ. Now suppose there is a derivation of ϕ of length n > 1. We may assume that the last step is MP. There are derivations of formulas ψ and ψ → ϕ of length less than n, respectively. By induction hypothesis, ψ and (ψ → ϕ) are derivable from the empty set. Axiom (iii) and MP yield ⊢ 4 ϕ. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2.6 For any
Proof. It suffices to consider m = 3. Then
, by axiom (ii) and transitivity of implication
Denotational semantics
Recall that a preorder is a binary relation which is reflexive and transitive (but not necessarily anti-symmetric). There are several ways to introduce Boolean prealgebras (see, e.g., [9, 17] ). We propose the following definition. A filter F (with respect to ≤ M ) in a Boolean prealgebra M is a non-empty subset F ⊆ M such that for all a, b ∈ M the usual filter axioms hold: ( a) ) represents a propositional tautology, it equals the top element of the quotient Boolean algebra. Hence, it is an element of any filter of the Boolean prealgebra, in particular of
in the quotient algebra with lattice order ≤ ′ iff f → (a, b) = f ⊤ (as in any Boolean algebra). By (i), F is the smallest filter of the Boolean prealgebra. One easily shows that the canonical homomorphism a → a maps F to the smallest lattice filter of the quotient algebra, i.e., to f ⊤ . Hence, the last condition is equivalent with
If M is a Boolean prealgebra with preorder ≤ M , then it is possible that M is already a Boolean algebra and ≤ M is not the lattice order ≤. In this case,
Thus, the smallest filter F w.r.t. ≤ M is a lattice filter of the Boolean algebra M, i.e., a filter w.r.t. ≤. The quotient algebra of M modulo ≈ M (i.e., modulo the lattice filter F ) then is a further Boolean algebra.
Boolean prealgebras are considered as models in research on Hyperintensions where logical modeling is investigated mainly from the viewpoint of natural language semantics (see, e.g., [9, 17] ). It is argued that possible worlds semantics does not provide enough intensions for the modeling of natural language meanings. Solutions are discussed where propositions are viewed as elements of Boolean prealgebras. However, a connection to Non-Fregean Logic, found in the next theorem, seems to have been unnoticed so far. Boolean prealgebras and models of SCI are essentially the same objects: Proof. The proof of (a) is straightforward. We prove (b). One easily checks that ≤ M ′ is a preorder, F is a filter and all sets T such as given in the theorem are ultrafilters w.r.t.
′ is the partial order as given in the definition and f ⊤ = F . It follows that the quotient algebra is a Boolean algebra with lattice order ≤ ′ . Finally, we show (c). Let M be a Boolean prealgebra. Then we obtain the SCI -model M ′ according to (a). From M ′ we obtain the Boolean prealgebra M ′′ in accordance with the construction in (b). By Lemma 3.2, the preorder of M is exactly the preorder defined for M ′′ . Also the universes and operations are the same. Thus, M = M ′′ . The second part of the assertion follows readily from the construction. Q.E.D.
We observe that for a given model of SCI one may find a Boolean prealgebra in a simpler way.
is a Boolean prealgebra. In fact, the quotient algebra modulo ≈ M ′ is the two-element Boolean algebra.
Definition 3.4 A propositional domain for the language F m(C) is a structure
where M is a non-empty set whose elements are called propositions, TRUE ⊆ M is the set of true propositions, N EC ⊆ M is the set of necessary propositions,
V is an assignment, x ∈ V and a ∈ M , then γ a x is the assignment which maps x to a and maps variables y = x to γ(y). An assignment γ extends in the following way to a unique function γ :
, where z is any new variable and λz.γ
model if the following conditions hold:
6 Very similar semantics for quantifiers are given in [10, 2] . Note that we cannot simply interpret the universal quantifier as an infinite meet operation or as the infimum of an arbitrary (infinite) subset. This would require a complete Boolean (pre)algebra -a condition which is apparently too strong to establish a Completeness Theorem (see the completeness proof below). Moreover, requiring the existence of countably complete (non-principal) ultrafilters would involve questions concerning the set-theoretical foundations.
(ii) The following truth conditions hold for all a, b ∈ M (even if NEC = ∅):
Note that if NEC = ∅, then TRUE is an ultrafilter. In order to see this, suppose a ∈ TRUE and a ≤ M b. The latter condition implies
Together with (ii)(b), this establishes the filter conditions. Using (ii)(c) one shows that TRUE is a maximal filter.
Observe that the higher-order function f ∀ : M M → M satisfies for every definable function t ∈ M M the following conditions:
The first equivalence is given by the conditions (iv)(l)+(iv)(h). This equivalence is important for the soundness of rule AN: if ϕ is an axiom and x ∈ f var(ϕ), then ∀xϕ is an axiom and, by rule AN, should be mapped to a necessary proposition. The second equivalence is given by the conditions (ii)(h)+(iv)(h) which ensure the following for any assignment γ ∈ M V : γ(∀xϕ) ∈ TRUE iff γ m x (ϕ) ∈ TRUE for all m ∈ M . Since TRUE and NEC are filters, a ≈ M b implies (a ∈ T RU E ⇔ b ∈ T RU E) and (a ∈ NEC ⇔ b ∈ NEC ). One also verifies that ≈ M is, by condition (iv)(f), a congruence relation with respect to f . In fact, (iv)(f) establishes monotonicity of
∈ TRUE with different truth values. Note that for a non-normal model, the conditions (i), (iii) and (iv) are irrelevant.
Lemma 3.5 (Coincidence Lemma
The proof of the Coincidence Lemma is an induction on ϕ, simultaneously for all assignments γ, γ ′ . The lemma says in particular that the denotation of a sentence, i.e., a formula with no free variables, is independent of any assignment and depends only from the Gamma-function.
Observe that if x, y are distinct variables, then (γ 
Proof. Induction on ϕ simultaneously for all assignments γ and all substitutions σ. The basis cases ϕ = x and ϕ = c follow immediately from the definition. Most of the cases of the induction step follow straightforwardly. We show the quantifier case. Let u ∈ V such that u / ∈ f var(σ(x)) for all x ∈ f var(∀yψ). Then one easily checks that (γσ)
and every a ∈ M . In the following, let u be the variable forced by the substitution σ w.r.t. ∀yψ. Then:
Notice that the Substitution Lemma implies equations of the following form:
Satisfaction (truth) of ϕ in the interpretation (M, γ) is defined as follows:
(M, γ) ϕ :⇔ γ(ϕ) ∈ TRUE .
This notion extends in the usual way to sets of formulas. For
Φ ⊆ F m(C) define M od 3 (Φ) := {(M, γ) | M a normal S3 ∀ ≡ -model, γ ∈ M V and (M, γ) Φ}.
Logical consequence is defined as follows:
As usual, we write 3 ϕ instead of ∅ 3 ϕ. Logical consequence for the logics generated by the class of all normal S4 ∀ ≡ -models, the class of all normal S5 ∀ ≡ -models, respectively, are defined analogously.
Note that we have defined logical consequence only with respect to the class of normal models. This is in accordance with the situation in modal logic S3 where validity of a formula ϕ is defined as truth of ϕ in all normal worlds in all Kripke models.
It is not hard to show that a normal model satisfies all axioms and rules of inference. For instance, let ϕ ′ be a substitution-instance of the propositional tautology ϕ. In each Boolean algebra, ϕ is mapped by any assignment to the top element. Then in our Boolean prealgebras, ϕ is mapped by any assignment to an element of the smallest filter containing f ⊤ (if the model is normal, that filter is NEC ) and thus to an element of TRUE . By the Substitution Lemma, the same holds for ϕ ′ . Consider now the axiom ∀xϕ → ϕ[x := ψ]. Let M be a model and suppose (M, γ) ∀xϕ for some
, where ε is the identity substitution. We have γ = γε, for any assignment γ :
Also the soundness of axiom (vii) follows from the Substitution Lemma and the Coincidence Lemma (alternatively, one may carry out an induction on ϕ). We leave the remaining cases to the reader. 
Completeness
Completeness theorems for logics with an identity connective and quantifiers that range over a universe of denotations of formulas or sentences have been proved by several authors ( see, e.g., [10, 2, 19, 24] ). We apply the typical Henkin construction. Proof. The assertion is obviously true for most of the axioms. We show the assertion for axiom scheme (ix): ∀xϕ → ϕ[x := ψ]. We have If we want to make explicit that a derivation of a formula ϕ from a set Φ contains only formulas with constants from C, then we write Φ ⊢ 
11
Proof. We show the assertion by induction on the length n of a derivation of ϕ from Φ in language F m(C ′ In our treatment of Henkin sets (Definitions 4.4 and 4.6, Lemma 4.7) we adopt some ideas and notations from [18] .
Definition 4.4 A set Φ ⊆ F m(C) is called a Henkin set if
• Φ is maximally consistent
The next observation follows immediately from axioms (xii) and (xiii). 
11 "for almost all y ∈ V " means for all but finitely many variables. That is, there are only finitely many variables y such that the property stated in the Lemma does not hold.
Definition 4.6
To each pair ϕ, x, where ϕ ∈ F m(C) and x ∈ f var(ϕ), we assign exactly one new constant c ϕ,x / ∈ C and define
Note that ¬(ϕ x ) can be written as ∃x¬ϕ → ¬ϕ[x := c ϕ,x ]. In this sense, c ϕ,x can be seen as a witness for the truth of ∃x¬ϕ.
We may assume that n is minimal with this property. Let x := x n , ϕ := ϕ n , c := c n,ϕ ,
. We may apply Corollary 4.3 and obtain Φ ′ ⊢ 3 ∀xϕ and 
Proof. By axiom (v), ≈ Φ is reflexive and contains alpha-congruence. Suppose ϕ ≈ Φ ψ and consider the formula x ≡ ϕ, where x ∈ V var(ϕ). Since ϕ ≡ ϕ is an axiom, the axiom
together with MP yields ψ ≈ Φ ϕ. Thus, the relation is symmetric. Now let ϕ ≈ Φ ψ and ψ ≈ Φ χ. Let δ := (x ≡ χ), where x ∈ V var(χ). By axiom (vii) and MP,
The remaining cases follow in a similar way. Q.E.D.
Propositional logic, axiom (vi) and symmetry of ≈ Φ imply the next result.
Lemma 4.10 Let Φ be maximally consistent and ϕ, ψ ∈ F m(C). Then:
• If ϕ ≈ Φ ψ, then ϕ ∈ Φ ⇔ ψ ∈ Φ. . Note that ∀x(ψ[y := x]) = α ∀yψ. By axiom (v) and transitivity of ≈ Φ we get ∀xϕ ≈ Φ ∀yψ, that is, ∀xϕ = ∀yψ = f ∀ (t). Thus, f ∀ is well-defined. For each ∀xϕ ∈ M , the function t ∈ M M , given by t(c) = ϕ[x := c], is definable in the sense of Definition 3.4. This follows from the proof of Claim 2 below. Now it is not difficult to verify that M is a normal S3 ∀ ≡ -model. In particular, all truth conditions are satisfied. We only consider the conditions (ii)(g) and (iv)(a). We have ϕ = ψ iff ϕ ≡ ψ ∈ Φ iff f ≡ (ϕ, ψ) = ϕ ≡ ψ ∈ TRUE . This shows condition (ii)(g). Furthermore, if ϕ = ψ, then ϕ ≡ ψ ∈ Φ. By Lemma 2.6 and MP, (ϕ ≡ ψ) ∈ Φ. Hence, f ≡ (ϕ, ψ) = ϕ ≡ ψ ∈ NEC . Thus, condition (iv)(a) holds. Now let β : V → M be the assignment defined by x → x. We show that the interpretation (M, β) is a model of Φ.
Theorem 4.11 Every Henkin set has a normal model.

Proof. Let
Claim 2: β(ϕ) = ϕ, for all ϕ ∈ F m(C). Proof of the Claim: Induction on the quantifier rank qr(ϕ) of ϕ. By induction on the construction of quantifier-free formulas one easily shows that the assertion is true for all formulas of quantifier rank 0. Now suppose the assertion is true for all formulas of quantifier rank n. Let qr(ψ) = n and ϕ = ∀xψ. Then β(ϕ) = β(∀xψ) = f ∀ (λzβ 
Q.E.D.
Theorem 4.12 Every consistent set has a normal model.
Proof. Let Φ ⊆ F m(C) be consistent. We extend Φ to a Henkin set Φ * in an extended language F m(C * ), C ⊆ C * . Theorem 4.11 guarantees the existence of a normal model of Φ * . Its reduct w.r.t. the sublanguage F m(C) then will be the desired model of Φ. Let C 0 := C, Φ 0 := Φ. If C n and Φ n ⊆ F m(C n ) are already defined, then define
according to the notation of Definition 4.6. By Lemma 4.7, Φ n+1 is consistent in F m(C n+1 ). Finally, we put Φ + := n<ω Φ n . It follows that Φ + ⊆ F m(C * ), where C * = n<ω C n . Since derivation is finitary, Φ + is consistent in the language F m(C * ). By a standard argument based on Zorn's Lemma, Φ + extends to a maximally consistent set Φ * ⊆ F m(C * ). If Φ * ⊢ 3 ∀xϕ, then by axiom (ix): Φ * ⊢ 3 ϕ[x := c] for all c ∈ C * . On the other hand, suppose Φ * ⊢ 3 ϕ[x := c] for all c ∈ C * , where x ∈ f var(ϕ). Let n be minimal with the property ϕ ∈ F m(C n ). Then ϕ[x := c ϕ,x ] ∈ F m(C n+1 ) and c ϕ,
This is a contradiction to Φ * ⊢ 3 ¬(ϕ x ) and the consistency of Φ * . Therefore, Φ * ⊢ 3 ∀xϕ. We have shown that Φ * has the properties of a Henkin set. Let (M * , β) be a normal model of the Henkin set Φ * ⊆ F m(C * ) and let Γ * : C * → M be its Gamma-function. If we consider the restriction Γ : C → M of Γ * to C ⊆ C * , then we get a normal model M w.r.t. the sublanguage F m(C), the reduct of M * . Obviously, (M, β) Φ. Q.E.D. If Φ 3 ϕ, then using the Deduction Theorem (Lemma 2.3) one shows that Φ ∪ {¬ϕ} is consistent. The existence of a normal model of that set implies Φ 3 ϕ. The Completeness Theorem follows. 
Propositional identity, strict equivalence and the Collapse Theorem
Recall that by the Collapse Axiom we mean the scheme ( ϕ ∧ ψ) → (ϕ ≡ ψ). This logical property can be expressed in algebraic terms in the following way: "In every normal model, the smallest filter is {f ⊤ }."
Lemma 5.1 Propositional identity w.r.t. a given interpretation (M, γ) is a congruence relation containing alpha-congruence on F m(C). 12 Strict equivalence w.r.t. a given interpretation is an equivalence relation on F m(C). Moreover, propositional identity refines strict equivalence. That is,
3 (ϕ ≡ ψ) → ( (ϕ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ)).
Proof. Given a model (M, γ), it follows easily from model-theoretic properties that
ϕ ≡ ψ defines a congruence relation on F m(C) which contains alpha-congruence. Similarly, the relation ϕ ≈ s ψ :
. This shows the last assertion of the lemma. Q.E.D.
Note that strict equivalence is in general not a congruence on F m(C). The reason for this fact is the identity connective: see the remarks after Definition 3.4.
If the relations of strict equivalence and propositional identity coincide, then the algebraic structure of models simplifies dramatically: (ii) M is a Boolean algebra with NEC = {f ⊤ }.
(iii) ≤ M is a partial order. (iv) Strict equivalence coincides with propositional identity, that is:
M ∀x∀y((x ≡ y) ↔ ( (x → y) ∧ (y → x))).
Proof. (i) ⇒ (ii) is clear.
(ii) ⇒ (iii): Let ≤ be the lattice order. Then f → (a, b) = f ⊤ ⇔ a ≤ b, for all a, b ∈ M , as in any Boolean algebra. But under the condition NEC = {f ⊤ }, this is exactly the definition of the preorder ≤ M in Definition 3.4.
If we assign a, b to the variables x, y, respectively, then condition (iv) yields a = b. That is, ≈ M is the identity on M and the quotient algebra of M modulo ≈ M is M itself, which, by Definition 3.1, must be a Boolean algebra. Moreover, by Lemma 3.2,
Since ≈ M is the identity, the Collapse Axiom follows. Q.E.D.
Note that if the normal model M is a Boolean algebra, then its lattice order ≤ is not necessarily the preorder ≤ M . In other words, the set NEC , which is a filter w.r.t. ≤ M , may strictly extend the (smallest) lattice filter {f ⊤ } of the Boolean algebra. Since the lattice order ≤ refines ≤ M , NEC is also a lattice filter. The lattice order coincides with ≤ M if and only if the Boolean algebra M satisfies the Collapse Axiom. Similarly, the condition of a model M to satisfy the Collapse Axiom is not sufficient for M being a Boolean algebra: ≤ M may be not anti-symmetric.
The models of the modal SCI -theories studied in [21] satisfy the properties (i)-(iv) of the Collapse Theorem. Also the models of the non-Fregean logic developed by Ishi [12, 13] are Boolean algebras and satisfy the Collapse Axiom (the identity connective of that logic, however, satisfies in general not all SCI -axioms of propositional identity).
Theorem 5.3 We consider here the language F m m of basic modal propositional logic. If we introduce an identity connective defining
ϕ ≡ ψ := (ϕ → ψ) ∧ (ψ → ϕ),
then the axiom schemes of propositional identity (v)-(vii) of AX are derivable in S3.
13
That is, propositional identity is definable by strict equivalence in S3.
Proof. Suppose a connective ≡ is defined in that way. We consider derivations in modal logic S3. Since (ϕ → ϕ) is derivable (by Axiom Necessitation), we get ϕ ≡ ϕ, i.e. axiom (v') of propositional identity. Axiom (vi) derives from axiom (ii). In order to prove that axiom (vii) is derivable it suffices to show that the following are theorems:
It is known that ( ϕ ∧ ψ) ↔ (ϕ ∧ ψ) is a theorem of S3. Hence, strict equivalence between ϕ and ψ can be expressed by (ϕ ↔ ψ). By propositional logic and rule AN we get ((ϕ ↔ ψ) → (¬ϕ ↔ ¬ψ)). Axiom (iii) and MP then yield the first theorem above. Similarly, we get the second, third and fourth theorem. Let us look at formula number 5. By propositional logic and AN:
. By axiom (iv) and transitivity of implication:
). This yields the fifth theorem. Finally, by axiom (iv) we have (ϕ → ψ) → ( ϕ → ψ) and
. From this one easily derives the last theorem. The scheme of axiom (vii) now follows by induction on formulas. Q.E.D.
Corollary 5.4 S3 is the weakest Lewis modal system in which propositional identity is definable by strict equivalence.
Proof. We saw that in S3 all axioms of propositional identity can be derived if one defines propositional identity by strict equivalence. A particular axiom of propositional identity is the following:
). This, however, is not a theorem of the weaker Lewis system S2 as one can show by constructing a Kripke model of S2 (i.e., a Kripke model with at least one normal world and reflexive accessibility relation) where that formula is not true. Q.E.D.
Representation theorems
K. Fine [8] extends normal modal logics by axioms for propositional quantifiers and studies several conditions which can be imposed upon the set of propositions. A natural condition, trivially satisfied in our denotational approach, is that propositions "are closed under formulas", i.e., each formula under any valuation denotes ("interprets") a proposition. In particular, propositions are closed under Boolean operations. We define here a S3π-frame as a triple F = (W, N, R, P ), where W is a set of worlds, N ⊆ W is a non-empty set of normal worlds, R ⊆ W × W is a reflexive and transitive accessibility relation, and P ⊆ P ow(W ) is the set of propositions ("closed under formulas"). In particular, ∅, W ∈ P . We may assume here that the only world accessible from a non-normal world w is w itself. This will be helpful for the definition of proposition in the context of non-normal modal logic S3. We work with the language F m(C 0 ) where C 0 = {⊥, ⊤}. A valuation is a function g : V → P which extends to the set of constants such that g(⊥) := ∅ and g(⊤) := W . If g, g ′ are valuations such that g(y) = g ′ (y) for all y ∈ V {x}, then we write g = x g ′ . The satisfaction relation for a normal world w ∈ N is defined as follows:
The satisfaction relation for a non-normal world w ∈ W N is given in the same way except for the condition concerning the modal operator which is replaced by the following:
(w, g) ϕ
Let S3π be the set of formulas true at all normal worlds in all S3π-frames under all valuations. If we consider those frames where N = W , then we obtain the theory S4π. S5π results from S4π by imposing the additional condition that R in each frame is an equivalence relation. This is essentially the same way as the theories S4π and S5π are defined in [8] . Of course, our theories contain, in addition, theorems with identity connective (this connective is not an element of the language considered by Fine [8] ). Note that all axioms of AX belong to S3π. One also easily checks that
Recall that the latter is also derivable from AX (see Lemma 2.6). The former, however, is valid iff the Collapse Axiom holds (see Theorem 5.2). Note that
is not a theorem of S3π. So we cannot replace ϕ ≡ ψ by (ϕ ↔ ψ) in every context (both formulas are equivalent in normal worlds but they do not necessarily denote the same proposition).
In standard modal logic, a proposition is usually regarded as a set of possible worlds. Relative to a given world w of a given frame one may regard the proposition denoted by ϕ as the set of those worlds which are accessible from w and where ϕ is true. Accordingly, two formulas ϕ and ψ denote the same proposition at world w iff ϕ ≡ ψ is true at w. Theorem 6.1 Let k ∈ {3, 4, 5}, let F = (W, N, R, P ) be a Skπ-frame and C 0 = {⊥, ⊤}. For every world w ∈ W and every valuation g : V → P there exist a Sk 
In particular, (M, γ) ϕ ≡ ψ ⇔ (w, g) ϕ ≡ ψ. That is, ϕ and ψ denote the same proposition in M iff they denote the same proposition in F at world w. Thus, the concept of a proposition as the denotation of a formula in model M and the modal concept of a proposition as a set of possible worlds are equivalent.
Proof. For each p ∈ P let c p be a constant symbol such that p = q implies c p = c q . Put C := {c p | p ∈ P }. We may assume that ⊥, ⊤ ∈ C. A valuation g : V → P now extends to a function on V ∪ C such that g(c p ) = p. The second clause of the truth definition above says: (w, g) c :⇔ w ∈ g(c), where c is now any element of C. By induction on formulas, simultaneously for all valuations, one shows the following facts:
. The Kripke semantics implies: (w, g) (∀xϕ ↔ ∀xψ[y := x]). That is, ∀xϕ = ∀xψ[y := x]. Note that ∀xψ[y := x] and ∀yψ are alpha-congruent. Thus, f ∀ (t) = ∀xϕ = ∀yψ and f ∀ is welldefined. One verifies that all conditions of a S3 ∀ ≡ -model are satisfied. For instance, condition (iv)(k) holds because the Barcan formula and its converse belong to S3π. Let γ : V → M be the assignment defined by x → x. In the same way as in Claim 2 of Theorem 4.11 one shows by induction of the quantifier-rank that γ(ϕ) = ϕ for all ϕ ∈ F m(C). Then for every ϕ ∈ F m(C):
Finally, we consider the "reducts" of both models (i.e., the restrictions of the Gammafunction, of the valuation g, respectively) to the sublanguage F m(C 0 ) ⊆ F m(C). This yields the assertions. Note that M is the two-element Boolean algebra if w is a non-normal world. Q.E.D.
Lemma 6.2 Let F be a filter of a S3
Suppose there is a ∈ X F . Using Zorn's Lemma (or an appropriate weaker principle) one shows that F extends to a maximal filter (i.e., an ultrafilter) which does not contain a. We get a / ∈ X, a contradiction. Hence, F = X, i.e., F is the meet of all ultrafilters extending F . Q.E.D.
Some parts of the next result have parallels to the Jónsson-Tarski Theorem which essentially says that a Boolean algebra with operators is embeddable in the full complex algebra of its ultrafilter frame (see, e.g., [1] for a detailed discussion). In the proof of the following Theorem 6.3 we shall construct a desired Kripke model from the ultrafilters of a given Sm ∀ ≡ -model, where m ∈ {4, 5}, such that the same formulas are satisfied. We were unable to prove the theorem for arbitrary S3 ∀ ≡ -models. Note that also the Jónsson-Tarski Theorem is applicable only to normal modal logics.
Recall that by F m m we denote the set of formulas of pure modal logic (without identity connective and without quantifier). 
Moreover, if the model M satisfies the Collapse Axiom and is a Boolean algebra, then the implication in the second line of (6.2) can be replaced by a biconditional ⇔, i.e., ϕ, ψ ∈ F m m denote the same proposition in M under γ iff they denote the same proposition at world w under valuation g.
Proof.
Let TRUE , NEC be the sets of true, necessary propositions, respectively, ≤ M the induced preorder of M and W := {T | T is an ultrafilter w.r.t. ≤ M }. Then TRUE ∈ W . For each a ∈ M let |a| := {T | a ∈ T ∈ W }. Define P = {|a| | a ∈ M }, the set of propositions for the desired Kripke model. For T ∈ W let NEC T := {a ∈ M | f (a) ∈ T } and define the relation
Proof of the claim. By Lemma 3.2, NEC = {a ∈ M | a ≈ M f ⊤ } and NEC is the smallest filter. Claim 2: For each T ∈ W , NEC T ⊆ T . In particular, T is an ultrafilter w.r.t. ≤ T . Proof of the claim. Let a ∈ NEC T . By definition, f (a) ∈ T . Since f (a) ≤ M a and T is a filter, we get a ∈ T . This shows the first part of the claim. We have 
) is a propositional tautology. By Axiom Necessitation, ϕ is a theorem. By soundness, ϕ is valid. Choose an assign- 
Proof of the claim. Since NEC T is the smallest filter w.r.t. ≤ T , it is the intersection of all ultrafilters w.r.t. ≤ T . By Claim 4, all those ultrafilters belong to W and the claim follows.
We define the accessibility relation R on W by:
It is clear that R is reflexive. Suppose T RT ′ RT ′′ . Let a ∈ NEC T . Since we are dealing with a S4
′′ . This shows that R is transitive. Note that each NEC T is non-empty because NEC ⊆ NEC T . Hence, there are no non-normal worlds in W . Thus, (W, R) is a frame of modal logic S4. For a given assignment β : V → M of model M we define the valuation g β : V → P by g β (x) := |β(x)|. Claim 9: For any ϕ ∈ F m m , any assignment β : V → M of model M and any world T ∈ W :
The claim follows by induction on ϕ ∈ F m m . The basis case ϕ = x is true by the definition of g β :
Most of the remaining cases now follow straightforwardly from the induction hypothesis and the definition of an assignment. We show the case ϕ = ψ:
Thus, Claim 9 is true. We consider the world TRUE ∈ W , the given assignment γ : V → M and the valuation g γ . 14 Then for all ϕ ∈ F m m :
This shows the first part of (6.2). Now suppose (M, γ) ϕ ≡ ψ for ϕ, ψ ∈ F m m . Then γ(ϕ) = γ(ψ). Thus, γ(ϕ) ∈ T iff γ(ψ) ∈ T , for each T ∈ W . Then from Claim 9 it follows that (TRUE , g γ ) (ϕ ↔ ψ). Finally, suppose M is a Boolean algebra that satisfies the Collapse Axiom. Then, by Theorem 5.2, propositional identity ϕ ≡ ψ is given by strict equivalence (ϕ ↔ ψ). The last assertion of the theorem now follows from the first line of (6.2). Q.E.D. 
∈ T and a / ∈ NEC T . Hence, NEC T ⊆ NEC and therefore NEC = NEC T . The accessibility relation R on W is given as before. Then by Claim 3', NEC T = NEC = NEC T ′ for any worlds T, T ′ ∈ W . Thus, all worlds of W are related by R, and R is an equivalence relation. Then (W, R) is a frame of modal logic S5. Also 14 Note that NEC = NEC TRUE . Thus, by Claim 1, the world TRUE accesses every T ∈ W . Claim 9 is true. The assertion now follows in the same way as in the proof of the theorem. Q.E.D. 
A simpler and more intensional semantics
AX contains the scheme (viii), ∀x(ϕ ≡ ψ) → (∀xϕ ≡ ∀xψ), which represents an extensional principle. It can be read as follows: "Two definable functions are equal if they have the same extensions (the same graphs)". Our aim is to relax such extensional constraints whenever this is possible and meaningful. In fact, we are able to define a weaker semantics such that axiom scheme (viii) as well as the Barcan formula can be avoided.
Let AX
− be the set of axioms which is given by the smallest set that contains all formulas (i)-(vii) and (ix)-(xii) of AX and is closed under the following condition: If ϕ ∈ AX − and x ∈ f var(ϕ), then ∀xϕ ∈ AX − . As before, an assignment of a model with universe M is a function γ : V → M . In contrast to the denotational semantics of the first kind, however, there is no canonical way to extend γ to a function γ : F m(C) → M . In fact, there is no explicitly given algebraic structure on the universe of a model although parts of such structure can be restored. Instead of an explicit algebraic structure, there are certain structural conditions concerning assignments and substitutions. This style of semantics was designed in [19] and has been further developed in [24] and [16] . We shall adopt some technical machinery coming from the last two works, with some improvements and simplifications. For all assignments γ : V → M and all formulas ϕ, ψ ∈ F m(C) the following truth conditions hold:
The following Substitution Lemma II is a version of [Lemma 3.14, [14] ]. 
The relation of satisfaction (truth) is defined as before, we use the same notation. Similarly as before, one verifies that a simple model satisfies all axioms of AX − under any assignment (instead of the Substitution Lemma and the Coincidence Lemma now apply the Substitution Property and the Coincidence Property, respectively). In order to achieve soundness of the rule of Axiom Necessitation we impose the following semantic constraint: Note that in an admissible (simple) model, NEC = ∅. We write Φ ⊢ ϕ if there is a derivation of ϕ from Φ using axioms from AX − and the rules of Modus Ponens and Axiom Necessitation. We write Φ ϕ if for every admissible simple model M and any assignment γ :
Theorem 7.4 (Soundness and Completeness of AX
Proof. We have already discussed soundness of the calculus and now concentrate on the completeness proof. The results and definitions 4.1 -4.10 of the first completeness proof remain unchanged. Of course, also the Deduction Theorem and Generalization can be adopted without any restrictions. Our task is now to construct an admissible simple model for a given set Φ which is a Henkin set w.r.t. the system based on AX − . The construction is very similar to that given in the proof of Theorem 4.11. The universe M , the sets TRUE and NEC and the Gamma-function are defined in the same way. We do not define operations
Instead, we have to determine in which way an assignment γ : V → M extends to a function γ : F m(C) → M such that the structural properties and the truth conditions of a simple model are satisfied. For a given assignment γ : V → M we fix a function τ γ : V → F m(C) with the property τ γ (x) ∈ γ(x) for every x ∈ V . The Claim 2 below shows that the actual choice τ γ (x) ∈ γ(x) is not relevant. We interpret τ γ as a substitution (this implies τ γ (c) = c for c ∈ C). As in the first completeness proof, the relation ≈ Φ is defined by Φ ⊢ ϕ ≡ ψ, where Φ is maximally consistent, and by ϕ we denote the equivalence class of ϕ modulo ≈ Φ . Then we define the extension of an assignment γ : V → M by γ(ϕ) := ϕ[τ γ ],
for ϕ ∈ F m(C). Proof of the Claim: Clearly, γ(c) = c = Γ (c) for c ∈ C. In order to show the Coincidence Property let ϕ ∈ F m(C) and let γ, γ ′ be assignments such that γ(x) = γ ′ (x) for all x ∈ f var(ϕ). Then τ γ (x) ≈ Φ τ γ ′ (x) for all x ∈ f var(ϕ). Now we may apply Claim 2. Next, we show the Substitution Property. Let γ : V → M be an assignment, σ : V → F m(C) a substitution and ϕ ∈ F m(C). We must show: γ(ϕ[σ]) = γσ(ϕ). Recall that γσ : V → M is the assignment given by x → γ(σ(x)), Hence, (M, β) Φ. Finally, it remains to show that every consistent set extends to a Henkin set (in an extended language). We may adopt the construction given in the proof of Theorem 4.12. Q.E.D. The converse of Theorem 7.5 is false. That is, the "simple" semantics is strictly weaker or more general than the semantics of the first kind. This follows from the corresponding soundness and completeness theorems and the fact that AX − is strictly contained in AX. Nevertheless, given an admissible simple model M, we are able to restore the structure of a Boolean prelattice on M . The function f ∨ , for instance, is defined as follows. Given any two elements a, b ∈ M , put f ∨ (a, b) := γ(x ∨ y) whenever γ is an assignment and x, y ∈ V such that γ(x) = a and γ(y) = b. Of course, such an assignment and variables can be found. Moreover, that definition is independent of the particular assignment and the particular variables: Suppose there is another assignment γ ′ and variables u, v with γ ′ (u) = a and γ ′ (v) = b. Let σ = ε be the identity substitution and let σ ′ be the substituition [x := u, y := v]. Then γ(σ(x)) = a = γ ′ (σ ′ (x)) and γ(σ(y)) = b = γ ′ (σ ′ (y)). Substitution Lemma II yields:
However, it is not clear how to restore the higher-order function f ∀ without a semantic property that corresponds to axiom (viii).
One goal of the paper was to present a non-Fregean semantics for some Lewis modal logics such that the relation of propositional identity does not suffer from too many restrictions. By the Collapse Theorem 5.2, propositional identity refines strict equivalence, and both relations collapse iff the given model is a Boolean algebra and satisfies the Collapse Axiom. The existence of an intensional model would imply that there are, up to alpha-congruence, no restrictions at all on the relation of propositional identity, more precisely, ⊢ 3 ϕ ≡ ψ iff ϕ = α ψ, for all ϕ, ψ ∈ F m(C). The construction of an intensional model, however, is difficult because of the impredicativity of propositional quantification. We believe that a similar construction as in [16] can be applied.
Finally, we would like to point out that our approach strongly relies on the modal principles inherent in Lewis modal systems S3-S5 and on the concept of propositional identity given by the axioms (v)-(vii). A non-Fregean semantics that captures K as well as many other normal modal systems is found in [12, 13] . This is achieved by introducing a concept of propositional identity which is axiomatized in a different way. However, the approach presented in [12, 13] involves the semantic limitations of standard modal logic: the Collapse Axiom is valid and models are Boolean algebras.
